EASTERN QUESTION AND QUESTIONS, THE

BLISS, Edwin Munsell
Century, The
Volume 51, Issue 3
January 1896

It is increasingly evident to the Christian world that the Turkish empire is rapidly crumbling, and even the Sultan himself must feel that it will not be long before it has either entirely disappeared, or has shrunk to the dimensions of an Asia Minor kingdom scarcely the size of the Seljuk domain. Certainly at no previous time has there been such a general attack upon the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire. Whether Lord Salisbury told Rustem Pasha in so many words that further refusal to accept the plan of reforms would involve the dismemberment of the empire is of little importance. The English premier is not given to ill-considered speech, and his words in Parliament, followed by his speech at the Guildhall banquet, could mean nothing less than those plainer expressions attributed to him in private conversation. Not less significant are the indications of a concerted plan on the part of the Mohammedans of India to unite with Arabia in the recognition of a calif who shall restore the true succession, so arrogantly appropriated by the Tatar chieftains from beyond the Caspian. If this culminates, the last prop to Turkish pride as the defender of Islam will be gone, and the Sultan become no more than a sheik.

The world is thus brought face to face with the solution of the famous Eastern Question, a problem which has vexed and perplexed the diplomats of Europe for a full century. Just what that solution is to be is as yet hidden in the counsels of a very few men, if, indeed, it has taken complete shape even with them. There are many elements in its present form which were unknown —perhaps unthought of—a half or even a quarter of a century ago. Some of them simplify it, some render it more complex and difficult.

Up to the Treaty of Paris, and for some years after, the question was chiefly as to the occupancy of Constantinople and the control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and there were practically but two sides, the Russian and the European. In the Crimean war France fought cordially with England against Russia, simply because all alike dreaded the appearance of Russian fleets in the Mediterranean. The unanimous feeling was that no southern European coast would be safe if those straits were once thrown open to the great power of the North. Magenta and Solferino, Gravelotte and Sedan, changed the situation, and France has come to think that Russia may be a positive help rather than a danger. England, too, is apparently giving up the idea that it is necessary for her peace to coop Russia up in the Black Sea, and there seems to be a general consensus that while Russia should not be allowed to make that sea an inland lake, she may claim untrammeled passage to the markets of the world. As to Russia herself, she keeps her own counsel, as she always has done; but it seems probable that she has come to the conviction that this free passage will bring internal development of far greater value than the actual ownership of the straits at the expense of constant political unrest, not to say danger. So far as these three powers and their relation to Constantinople are concerned, the question is undoubtedly simpler. The Turkish capital would be made a free city, and the straits put under international guaranties.

Other elements, however, have come in, and other interests must be considered. There is, first, the Balkan peninsula, with its curious congeries of semi-independent states, each anxious to keep up a national existence with its concomitants of political influence and territorial expansion, and each liable at any moment to fall a prey to any one of the surrounding greater states. For a time it seemed as though Bulgaria was going to develop into the coming southeastern state of the Continent, but her most enthusiastic friends are hiding their heads in shame and discouragement. Greece has long been out of the race. Bosnia and Herzegovina have yielded to Austria, and Servia would be glad to do so to-morrow if Francis Joseph would but open the door. The sturdy men of Montenegro are trying to flatter themselves with an occasional sop from St. Petersburg, but not even a Kara George can stay the movement when it is once under way. Rumania alone seems to have any staying power, but that is probably due to the innate hostility between her Latins and the surrounding Slavs and Magyars.

What is to become of all these? Were it possible to unite them into one coherent mass under a centralized government, England, Germany, and perhaps Russia would be glad, even though it should involve the further postponement of the Panslavic ideal. That, however, is impossible. Shall Austria be allowed to extend herself indefinitely to the southeast? She would be glad to hold Saloniki and the rich valley of the Vardar; but whether her associates in the Triple Alliance would cordially assent may be doubted, although Italy might be appeased by the gift of Trieste—an easy thing for Austria, since she would still hold Fiume. On the other hand, Austria would scarcely care to add the Bulgarians to her already heterogeneous collection of subjects, especially as both Magyars and Germans would object to the possible reinforcement of Czech obstreperousness. Can Bulgaria be bolstered and educated into a kingdom, either alone or welded together with Servia, by some sort of diplomatic pressure? If so, how much of Macedonia fairly belongs to her? Can Albania, with its sturdy descendants of the Castriots, be safely committed to the rival followers of the Greek leaders, Trikoupis and Delyannis? These are some of the questions that come up the moment any plan for a general division of the Balkan peninsula is up for discussion.

Crossing into Asia Minor, the situation is even more perplexing. Here there is a dominant race, strongest not merely in numbers, but in force—a race, however, which absolutely cannot be intrusted with rule over any other race. There are only two ways in which a country can be governed with any success—by the strongest inhabiting race or by external power. The inhabiting race may be strong either in numbers or in force of character, but strongest it must be in some way. As a matter of fact, there is no race, or possible combination of races, in Asia Minor that is not overbalanced by the Turks both in numbers and in force of character. Were it possible to unite Armenians and Greeks, they might accomplish something; but racial and ecclesiastical jealousies absolutely forbid that. The other Christian populations need not be taken into the account at all. The question, then, lies between the continued rule of the Turk and foreign occupation. For some time it was thought that the Sultan might continue to rule in a contracted territory, with his capital at Brusa or Konieh. The events of the last few months, however, have pretty thoroughly dispelled that idea, and it appears as if the absolute overthrow of the Ottoman government would be necessary. In that case there must be foreign occupation. By whom? The first answer would undoubtedly be, Russia. This, however, would satisfy nobody. It would quench forever any hope of the development of either Armenian or Greek national life, and it would arouse the jealousy of all southern Europe; for the power that holds western Asia Minor and the archipelago dominates the Mediterranean and northern Africa. Greece and Italy would be at her mercy, and the Suez Canal be practically in her hands. Ambitious as Russia is, and attractive as such a position would be, if available, it is scarcely probable that the Czar would undertake it now. The expense of the civil and military administration of a thoroughly and intelligently hostile country of that size would be enormous, and strain her finances to the breaking-point; and the perplexities introduced would be so burdensome as to hamper, if not absolutely prevent, the development of her internal resources. The suggestion has been made lately that France be the occupying power. This would certainly be more acceptable to the Armenians and probably even to the Greeks, who, however much they may enjoy the Czar’s protection against the Turk, have no liking for his autocratic rule. Germany, too, might favor it in the hope that it would help to weaken the French passion for the revanche.

Aside from Asia Minor, there are questions of more or less difficulty concerning Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Arabia, and Mesopotamia. Ever since the Druse massacres France has held Syria as her special field of influence, as England has occupied Egypt; and there would probably be little difficulty in making her virtual protectorate actual but for the fact that naturally Palestine goes with Syria, and it is scarcely probable that the Greek Church would willingly see Jerusalem and the holy places come under Roman Catholic influence. What shall be done with Jerusalem is a problem scarcely less difficult than that presented by Constantinople. The Egyptian question is too well known to need more than the statement that any solution which would guarantee to England the safety of transit through the Suez Canal would probably be acceptable to her. Arabia the powers can well afford to leave alone for the present. There is little probability that the mutually hostile Bedouin tribes will unite in any such way as to endanger their neighbors. Mesopotamia offers certain difficulties. The oppression which has forced the Armenians into such prominence bears with almost equal severity upon the Jacobites, Chaldeans, Yezidis, and other non-Moslem races and sects, and even upon the agricultural Kurds of the regions of Suleimanieh and Kerkuk. At present there is no rule of any kind worth the name from Jezireh to Bassorah. The most important foreign interests are connected with the Catholic missions holding Mosul as their chief center, and under French protection, and the general Russian interest in keeping a way open to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Turkey being eliminated, to which of these shall the rich Tigris and Euphrates valleys belong, with the railways which will surely connect the eastern Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean, and possibly revive the commercial importance of Antioch and Bagdad? Here, however, the suggestion that France occupy Asia Minor comes in as a disturbing factor. To make her mistress of practically the whole, certainly the best part, of the Sultan’s dominion, would be to give her at no distant day, if not at present, a power and prestige to which all her neighbors would undoubtedly seriously object.

It becomes, thus, very evident that the Eastern Question, which was originally a simple trial of strength, chiefly diplomatic, between Russia and the rest of Europe, has become a most complicated series of questions, involving racial and commercial as well as political interests. What the solution will be it is premature to say. That the leaders are most seriously considering it is certain, and there are indications of a general agreement along certain lines. These are the entire overthrow of the Ottoman dynasty, and its replacement by some European government or governments. Austrian influence will be predominant in the Balkan peninsula, though Greece and Bulgaria will be somewhat enlarged and given another opportunity for national development, with the assurance that, unless they improve it better than they have those hitherto given, their ultimate absorption will be inevitable. Constantinople, with the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and a small territory on each side of the Sea of Marmora, will be made free territory, with some sort of government under international guaranties. Eastern Turkey will be added to Russian territory, and Russia will find a path to the Indian Ocean, though whether through Persia or Mesopotamia will depend very largely upon what terms can be arranged in regard to Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. It is scarcely possible that any of the rival Christian churches can secure full control of Jerusalem, and we may again see a principality of Judea. The Khalifa may find a potent rival in a new calif with his residence at Mecca, and the famous mosque school of Cairo may find its occupation of railing at English oppression of Islam gone. Of course these are mere surmises, which to some may seem utterly improbable. The cabinets at London, St. Petersburg, and Berlin, however, are dominated by positive, venturesome men—men, too, who are tired of much of the bickering of the last half-century, and would be glad to see the new one come in with a better mutual understanding and larger opportunities for peaceful development. There are many indications of their accomplishing this desire, and some who are in a position to surmise correctly intimate that the agreement will be substantially as outlined above. It may be deferred for a time by yielding on the part of the Sultan; but sooner or later he will find himself in a position where no yielding in form will secure obedience on the part of turbulent Kurds, Circassians, and even Turks. Then stronger hands will be compelled to take hold of the problem, and some solution, prompt as well as complete, will be necessitated.